Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative by Comstock, Gary
Truth or meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei 
on biblical narrative
Gary L. Comstock 
Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton, USA
Abstract
T ru th  o r meaning: R icoeur versus Frei on biblical 
narrative
Of the theologians and philosophers now writing on 
biblical narrative, Hans Frei and Paul Ricoeur are 
probably the most prominent. It is significant that their 
views converge on important issues. Both are uncom­
fortable with hermeneutic theories that convert the text 
into an abstract philosophical system, an ideal typolo­
g ical structure , or a m ere occasion for existential 
decision. Frei and Ricoeur seem knit together in a 
common enterprise; they appear to be building a single 
narrative theology. I argue that the appearance of 
symmetry is an illusion. There is a fundamental conflict 
between the ‘pure narrativism’ of Frei and the ‘impure 
narrativism’ of Ricoeur. I give reasons for thinking that 
R icoeur’s is the stronger position.
G od’s work is mysteriously, abidingly mysteriously, coexistent with the 
contingency o f  events. The history o f his providence is one that must be 
narrated. There is no scientific rule to describe it and eliminate the need 
for narration. Nor is there any historicist perspective or universal claim 
that can eliminate history’s narrative form  (Frei 1975: 163).
* This paper was read a( the Iowa Postscript Society and the N arrative In terpretation  and Theology 
G ro up of the A m erican Academy of Religion, D ecem ber 1983.
Permission to print in H T S  was granted by the University of Chicago Press, which holds the copyright 
to the article published in The Journal o f  Religion Vol 66, N o 2,1986.
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Truth or meaning
Of the theo logians and philosophers now writing on biblical narrative, Hans Frei 
and Paul R icoeur are probably the most prominent. It is significant that their views 
converge on important issues. For example, Ricoeur would agree with Frei’s claim 
that narrative is indispensable for understanding God’s work in history. Both would 
argue that scholars should attend to the Bible’s literary forms before speculating 
about its theological significance. Both are uncom fortable with herm eneutic 
theories that convert the text into an abstract philosophical system, an ideal 
typological structure, or a mere occasion for existential decision. Each one is 
convinced that the meaning of realistic narrative is to be found in, not apart from, 
the story’s own depiction of agents and circumstances. And each thinker puts great 
distance between his own work and the work of apologetics.
At first glance, the respective projects of Frei and Ricoeur seem knit together in 
a common enterprise; they appear to be building a single narrative theology. I will 
argue that this appearance of symmetry is an illusion. There is a fundamental 
conflict between the theologian and the philosopher, and I have tried to name it in 
my title. Is it enough to say that the biblical narratives are meaningful? Or are 
Christians also committed to saying that they are true? Frei thinks that the answer 
to the first question is yes, so he does not pursue the second. Ricoeur thinks the 
second demands an answer, and he tries to show how and why we should answer it 
affirmatively.1
Frei believes that Christians must stop short of making claims about the truth of 
the biblical stories; to do otherwise tempts us to think that the story of Jesus can be 
judged and justified by the canons of modern scientific knowledge. 2 As far as Frei 
is concerned it should be the other way around. E schewing, like Barth, the 
apologetic task of trying to explain the stories of G od’s providence to the 
nonbelieving public, he takes up the dogmatic task of finding appropriate norms to 
rule the use of these stories within the Christian community. For Frei, the scriptural 
stories have a singular meaning that is known to those within the bounds of 
Christian faith and practice. Insiders, however, are mistaken in trying to argue with 
outsiders about their truth.
Ricoeur agrees that the meanings of scriptural narratives are tied to their 
Christian audience. And he similarly believes that we ought to forgo apologetics. 
But he goes further than Frei on the matter of the stories’ truth claim, holding that 
the way Christians use the stories is precisely to refer. He takes up the task that Frei 
rejects: The attempt to say what we might mean when we talk about the truth of the 
biblical narratives. This implicates him in a complex philosophical project, not the 
least problematic aspect of which is an attempt to rewrite modern theories of truth
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and reference. While his project, like Frei’s, is far from complete, we now have 
sufficient statements from each thinker to hazard a comparison. I will argue that 
R icoeur’s is the more consistent position, and I will suggest that the philosopher’s 
‘impure narrativism’ is more faithful than the theologian’s ‘pure narrativism’ to the 
testimony of the scriptural stories. 3
I
Students of biblical hermeneutics are deeply indebted to Hans Frei for his masterful 
reconstruction of the fate of the realistic reading of the Bible. Exhaustive in scope 
and painstakingly argued, The eclipse o f biblical narrative is an achievem ent 
commanding wide attention; it is a work of classic stature, on the order of Erich 
Auerbach’s (1953) Mimesis.
Frei traces the dissolution of the precritical scholarly consensus in which the 
literal meaning of the stories in Genesis, Exodus, and the Synoptic Gospels was 
taken to be none other than their true historical meaning. With the influence of 
deism, historical criticism of the Bible, and Hume’s explication of the nature of 
historical claims, however, the veracity of the texts was called decidedly into 
question. The result? Biblical hermeneutics has been saddled ever since with the 
troublesom e distinction between the meaning of the text (what it says) and its 
reference (what it is about). Frei carefully explains the various attempts to bridge 
this purported dichotomy between meaning and reference; The literalistic reading 
of fundamentalism (the text gives an accurate account of what really happened), the 
mythological interpretation of DF Strauss (the text points toward an ancient mythic 
consciousness and its set of sacred archetypes), and the rationalistic interpretation 
of Kant (the text reveals the universal process of turning from bondage to moral 
freedom) (see Frei 1974: 244, 256, 263).
Frei shows that not one of these attem pts has been successful. R ealistic 
narratives admit no separation of meaning and reference. The referent of this 
literary genre is a kind of internal one; what the text is about is found precisely in its 
literary form. In the Gospel of Mark, for example, lifelike characters confront one 
another in familiar surroundings. The scriptural author employs a simple rhetoric, 
neither artificial nor heroic in style, to depict believable, everyday events mixed with 
miraculous, unbelievable occurrences. The subject m atter of Mark, then, is not 
found in historical events or philosophical arguments. It is found in the plot of the 
text and nowhere else. In Frei’s words, what the text is about is identical with its 
verbal m ean ing. He proposes in Eclipse (adm ittedly in sketchy form) a new 
herm eneutic, what he calls a ‘narrative in te rp re ta tio n ’ of the gospel story.
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According to this new method, we once again come to understand that story’s 
meaning not as ‘illustrated (as though it were an intellectually presubsisting or 
preconceived archetype or ideal essence) but constituted through the mutual, 
specific determination of agents, speech, social context, and circumstances that form 
the indispensable narrative web’ (Frei 1974: 280).
More than any other critic, Frei has exposed the mistake of separating the 
gospel’s ‘propositional content’ from its ‘literary form’. Theologians in the last few 
centuries have almost universally misunderstood stories such as the first three 
chapters of Genesis, Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, and Mark, thinking of them as 
enjoyable, aesthetic embellishments of some more basic, underlying message. But 
realistic narratives are not that. At once ordinary and extraordinary, they mingle 
noble and serious themes with casual, everyday occurrences. As a result, we are 
wrong to think of them as histories that refer to actions and events behind the text. 
We are also wrong to take them as myths referring to timeless archetypes (or 
universal principles) above it. Like the American New Critics who vigorously 
opposed ‘the heresy of paraphrase’ (see Yu 1978: 198-203), Frei (1974: 281) teaches 
us to reject any in terpretation that finds the meaning of these stories in some 
‘mysterious realm of being and meaning’, or in a ‘separable subject matter’, or in any 
‘combination of such behind-the-scenes projections, the meaning of these narratives 
is autonomous; they refer only to themselves. Mark means what it says and not 
another thing. As Frei (1974: 27, 33) puts it, scripture ‘simultaneously depicts and 
renders the reality (if any) of what it talks about’; its subject matter is ‘constituted by 
or identical with its narrative’.
I will refer to Frei’s hermeneutic theology as ‘pure narrativism’. It has many 
features to commend it. It insists that stories are primary in the order of human 
knowing and acting. It denies that history-like stories are reducible to historical, 
mythical, or philosophical propositions. Such narratives cannot be translated into 
any other discursive form. Pure narrativism restores to Christian theology the 
centrality and authority of the gospel’s form, reminding us that the original witnesses 
to Jesus’ life chose to tell stories about him and highlighting the fact that our 
religious convictions are best displayed in stories.4
These beliefs unite the pure and not-so-pure story theologians. T he main 
difference between them concerns the question of defending these claims. If 
someone were to ask us to justify them, what would we say? If someone were to ask 
how we know that the biblical narratives are true, how would we respond? Frei and 
Ricoeur agree on many things, but they do not agree on the answer to this question. 
They do not even agree that it is important. Both hold that the New Testament 
narrative of Jesus is essential for Christian faith and practice, but only Ricoeur
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believes that we can or should try to justify this belief as true. Frei does think the 
Christian story a true one, but only Ricoeur has gone on to try to spell out just what 
such a claim might entail. This may well be the major difference between pure and 
impure narrativists; only the latter believe it important to develop a theoretical 
justification of narrative hermeneutics. 5 For whatever reason, the former see little 
use for that particular philosophical project.6
I believe that the impurist’s response is the correct one. I will argue my case by 
trying to demonstrate that - despite its distaste for theories - pure narrativism rests 
on certain foundational principles. And they are principles ill suited to the narrative 
reading of the gospel.
Pure narrativists hold, correctly I think, that realistic stories are immediately 
intelligible to us. Intimately bound up with human self-understanding stories may 
well be the first literary structure that young children learn to follow. Those of us 
graced with the presence of the elderly know that stories are the favorite pastime of 
the very old. And when we think about the fundamental issues of human existence - 
the ‘big’ questions of life and death, the growth and decay of character and culture - 
we naturally do so in terms of stories (cf MacIntyre’s 1981 position). Some purists 
have argued not only that human life and community are story shaped but also that 
our very world has a narrative structure. Frei has not rested his case on any of these 
claims, but they do support his view; we are so adept at understanding stories that 
we have no need of any sophisticated theory to help us understand them.
As I have said, Frei does not appear interested in developing the philosophical 
foundations of ‘narrative hermeneutics’. He is more interested in persuasive and 
sensitive readings of specific Christian texts. In Identity, Frei (1975) criticizes those 
‘high-level’ herm eneutic theories that bury the subject m atter of, say, Mark 
underneath ‘ambitious’ and ‘all-encompassing’ theories of ‘understanding’ or ‘being’. 
He would appear to have the ‘new hermeneutic’ of Fuchs and Ebeling in mind, but 
one cannot help but wonder whether he would now include Ricoeur as one whose 
theory  endangers the specific m essage of the gospel. 7 ‘W hen this "new 
hermeneutic" view, with its claim to omnicompetence in interpretation, is applied to 
realistic narrative, not only is the subject matter turned into something other than 
the story and what it depicts, but even what is supposed to be the true subject matter 
is nothing except in and by the relation and family resemblance between it and the 
interpreter’ (Frei 1975: xvii).
Frei objects to the practitioners of the existentialist herm eneutic (be they 
Americans, Germans, Freudians, or structuralists) for allowing their ‘general theory’ 
to ‘dictate to’ their exegetical practice. He makes no bones about his displeasure 
with these methods; they are ‘useless’, operating at an ‘ethereal level’, inadequate as
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guides for interpreting the actual stories of the New Testament.
Frei has no use for such all-encompassing hermeneutic foundations. But this is 
not to say that he is an antifoundationalist. 8 He does not make a great deal of 
them, but he is at least aware of his own general interpretive principles. I find at 
least two tenets grounding his proposal for ‘narrative interpretation’. T hese might 
be formulated in terms of a general literary principle and a general philosophical 
principle. One of Frei’s literary foundations is that the meaning of a realistic 
narrative is autonomous. Meaning is tied neither to its author’s nor to its reader’s 
beliefs, intentions, or practices. In the quote above, Frei scores those who closely tie 
the subject m atter of the biblical text to the response of an interpreter. One of 
Frei’s philosophical foundations is related. The narratives of the Bible are self 
preferential, not referring to anything other than themselves. Earlier, I indicated 
the extent to which Frei distances realistic narrative from history, myth and 
philosophy.
If I am right to think that these are Frei’s conceptual foundations, then I can 
understand his reason for backing away from discussions of the stories’ truth. In the 
modern period, discussions of truth focus on propositions and how propositions 
correspond to external reality. Such arguments rarely consider linguistic units 
longer than the sentence. Textual forms - such as narratives - are never considered. 
Given this philosophical prejudice, stories cannot be considered as either true or 
false. Only individual statements in the story can be granted that status.
Unfortunately, Frei’s view does not challenge this prejudice. Pure narrativists 
are content to except narratives from the rigorous debate about truth conditions. 
Stories, they tell us, do not make assertions about the world. Narratives are not 
interested in ‘corresponding’ to some reality outside them. Thus, we have no need 
to ask about their ‘truth’.
I do not think we should be content with this account. Frei’s exegetical practice 
is masterful, and his actual reading of the gospel is one that, happily, is receiving 
more and more attention. But I believe that this reading receives no support from 
his (stated or implied) theoretical foundations. Indeed, I am convinced that both of 
his theoretical principles are mistaken and that the particular confessional theology 
associated with them does not do justice to the intentions of those who hear and tell 
the New Testament story as their own.
Frei’s first book chronicles the history of errors of the last several centuries of 
synoptic criticism. It argues persuasively that these scholars have almost universally 
misinterpreted the story, primarily because they have misconstrued its genre. On 
Frei’s reading, the gospel is a carefully constructed and unique literary work. Its 
peculiar aim is to identify the singular man Jesus of Nazareth while also rendering
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him present to the reader. How can these two goals possibly be achieved? The 
answer is found only in getting clear about the precise identity of the main 
character. Jesus is not only a carpenter’s son, born in Bethlehem, baptized by John, 
and crucified in Jerusalem. He is also the Savior, the Redeemer, the Son of God 
resurrected from the dead. According to Frei, the text intends to show the reader 
that the ‘fictional Jesus’ (my own phrase) ‘is what he appeared to be - the Savior 
Jesus from Nazareth, who underwent "all these things" and who is truly manifest as 
Jesus, the risen Christ’ (Frei 1975: 138).
This is at once an original and traditional interpretation; it retrieves in a 
modern idiom the ancient literal and figural readings on which Christian identity is 
based. It is a reading on which pure and impure narrativists might agree. My 
interest here is not in the soundness of the exegesis but in the fit between this 
reading and Frei’s hermeneutic theory. Let us remind ourselves of its bases. As a 
literary foundation, Frei holds that texts and readers are independent. As a 
philosophical foundation, he claims that stories are not reducible to propositional 
claims. Can we harmonize these tenets with his interpretation of the gospel? I do 
not think so. It seems that at the level of practical exegesis, Frei finds a specific 
reader response in ‘the text itself as well as a specific truth claim apart from which 
the story’s meaning is unintelligible.
Let me explain. Consider first Frei’s principle of autonomy.
According to Frei’s theoretical suggestion, the meaning of a realistic story is 
separable from the receptive intentions of its audience. But in practice his reading 
seems to demand what we might call a ‘correctly interpreting reader’, one who is 
actually having the experience outlined by the text. No reader will get the meaning 
of the gospel narrative unless he simultaneously knows the presence of Jesus Christ. 
If that particular experience is lacking, if the reader fails to identify and encounter 
the fictional Jesus, then the narrative’s meaning is not present at all. Only under 
those conditions in which we have a ‘proper reader response’ (my phrase) will the 
meaning of this text occur. For only then can we affirm, with Frei, that Jesus’ textual 
identity and his existential presence are given together.
Now, a question arises as to whether a non-Christian reader can know who the 
fictional Jesus is without ever encountering the living Christ. Frei’s answer is 
ambiguous. Christians, he says, ‘are forced to consent to the factuality of what we 
represent to ourselves imaginatively. We must affirm that to think of [Jesus] is to 
have him actually present, (Frei 1975: 15). But what about non-Christians? Can the 
unbeliever know who the protagonist of this story is? Apparently not, for whenever 
anyone really knows who Jesus is, there Jesus is present as well. Not to have him 
present or not to be experiencing his presence would, on Frei’s view, be the same
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thing as not to be thinking of him at all. But, of course, unbelievers just are those 
for whom Jesus is not present or who, at least, do not experience that presence. So 
it seems that unbelievers cannot understand the story, not being able to understand 
who the major character is.
Here are the two passages in which Frei most clearly expresses his position: ‘For 
the believer to know who Jesus Christ is, to affirm his presence, and to adore him 
are one and the same thing .... Just as Christ’s presence and identity cannot be 
conceived apart, factual affirmation of him and commitment to him cannot be 
conceived apart either’. ‘For whomever [the story] becomes the truth it does so ... by 
hammering out a shape of life patterned after its own shape ... the shape of the story 
being mirrored in the shape of our life is the condition of its being meaningful for 
us’ (Frei 1975: 156,170-171). In these passages the ambiguity remains as to whether 
Frei thinks Jesus’ identity is given only to Christian readers of the text. In the first 
passage he says Jesus’ presence and identity go together ‘for the believer’. In the 
second, he says mirroring the shape of the story in our own lives is the condition of 
its being meaningful for us. The context of the second quotation implies that Frei is 
once again referring to Christians, but one could read it as referring to any reader. 
If ‘living out its shape’ is a necessary condition of the story’s being meaningful for 
Christians, must not it also be a condition its being meaningful for anyone else? In 
support of this interpretation is Frei’s own definit ion of realistic narrative. Recall 
that the meaning of any story of this sort is intelligible to all, it is a genre that 
‘renders its sense to the reader, no matter how he disposes himself toward the story 
on a personal level’ (Frei 1975: xv).
The ambiguity of Frei’s position on this subject is not worth belaboring. What is 
clear is that Frei insists on the coincidence of Jesus’ identity in the text with the 
experience of the risen Christ by the reader. The story’s meaning is found, as it 
were, ‘between’ the text and the audience.9 As the reader sympathetically follows 
the progressive unfolding of Jesus’ identity in the narrative she must simultaneously 
be ‘affirming’ and ‘adoring’ him in the present. If not, the reader has missed the 
story’s meaning because she has not correctly identified its major character. Frei’s 
actual reading shows that in the case of at least this one realistic narrative, meaning 
is unintelligible apart from reader response. That is, we cannot say what the 
meaning of the story is without referring to what is going on with the reader. But 
this, of course, is just what the doctrine of autonomy was meant to deny.
Is there a way to save the idea of autonomy? That depends on how strictly we 
wish to take it. One way Frei could retrieve it would be to say the following: this 
story’s meaning really is autonomous, but it is only available to a certain class of 
readers. This interpretation would harmonize Frei’s theory with his practice; the
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gospel’s meaning really would be independent of its readers, but only a select few 
would have access to it. While this would harmonize Frei’s theoretical commitment 
with his exegetical practice, it is clear that he does not want his theory understood in 
this way. He has recently cited with approval Calvin’s comment that while ‘our 
hearts and minds may need illumination, the text does not. It is plain for all to read’ 
(Frei 1982: 22). If his interpretation of the gospel is so at odds with his foundational 
literary principle, why does he advert to it in the first place? The answer may lie in 
its theological implications.
On the interpretation I have just offered, Frei’s position reads as a kind of 
fideism; in order to understand the gospel you must first believe in Christ. But Frei 
seems to know the intractable problems that accompany this position. By insisting 
on the doctrine of autonomy, he has a way to elude the charge of theological 
sectarianism. By claiming that the gospel is a realistic narrative, and by defining 
that genre as one whose meaning is accessible to all, Frei has a neat way to escape 
from the fideistic corner.
If 1 am right about the inappropriateness of his autonomy doctrine, however, his 
escape seems much less believable. The logic of his view entails that he get 
tremendous theological mileage out of a literary vehicle he does not really own.
There is another way for him to salvage the autonomy principle. That would be 
to say that the meaning of every realistic narrative is autonomous but, in the specific 
case of the New Testament writings, the activities of the reader are to be construed 
as part of the text itself. In this way, the continuing spiritual presence of Jesus in the 
church (that is, in the group of correctly interpreting readers) could be construed as 
an irreducible part of Jesus’ identity in the story.
This second interpretation again seems to preserve the doctrine of autonomous 
meaning. Imaginatively enlarge the boundaries of what you consider as ‘the text 
itself, include all Christian readers’ experiences of Christ’s presence in it, and we 
can still hold on to the New Critics’ principle.
This seems like a viable option for Frei until we stop to think about what has 
happened to the original doctrine. Its meaning has now been stretched so far that it 
is im possible to give it any clear sense. The text’s m eaning on this second 
interpretation is no longer independent of its readers’ activities at all. The identity 
of the main character in the book is tied to a vast range of persons, rituals, and 
institutions not even alluded to by the text. These are surely ‘extratextual’ matters, 
not at all within the margins of any autonomous ‘text itse lf. I conclude that 
autonomy is a hermeneutic principle that conflicts with Frei’s own narrative reading 
of the gospel. We will want to find a better explanation of the text-reader relation.
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Now think about Frei’s philosophical principle that states that narrative is self- 
preferential. How are stories connected with the world, with nonnarrative modes of 
d iscourse, with propositional truth claims? On this matter, too, Frei, in principle, 
allows little relationship if any. T he gospel does not refer to anything external to or 
outside itself. Narratively referring to its own world, the meaning of the story is 
neither a set of assertions nor a sequence of temporally ordered propositions. 
R ealistic narratives do not invite readers to assess the truth of each of their 
sentences (as if they were histories), nor do they invite an appraisal of their logical 
coherence (as if they were philosophical arguments). Rather, these narratives are 
linguistic units in their own right, depicting or rendering their own subject matter. 
We have already seen what this subject matter is in the case of the New Testament. 
It is a unique m ean ing, one that claims the entire being of the reader. To 
understand the text properly is to consent to enter the language game of Christian 
belief and practice.
While Frei is theoretically committed to the self-referentiality of the story, his 
actual reading of the gospel strains his theory. His practical exegesis demands that 
we think of the story of Jesus as pointing, in part, to a complex range of human 
activity: namely, piety. The reference of the story is at least partially to the ‘form of 
life’ in which Christ is experienced as present. This view holds out great promise for 
introducing sacramental theology into narrativist discussions. But it does not sit well 
with the principle of narrative self-reference.
Why is Frei attracted to this foundation? We can only speculate, but again 
there seems to be a theological explanation.
Frei gets two things from his principle. The first is an argument against 
apologetics. It will not make any sense for Christians to try to engage in rational 
conversation about whether Jesus was actually born to Mary, baptized by John, or 
raised by God if this story can only be understood by Christians. The conversation 
would only make sense to those who know whom it is we are talking about. And, by 
virtue of the nature of Jesus Christ, only believers know who that is. But, since 
rational conversations by definition are open to all reasonable persons, we have no 
reason to think that we can or ought to participate in one in which Jesus is the 
subject. In such instances, our response ought not to be conversing or arguing but 
proclaiming.
Second, because our beliefs are not open to the sort of public scrutiny that 
modern philosophy has come to demand for truth claims, members of the Christian 
religion are entitled simply to claim that when we talk about Jesus’ identity we are 
not making rational, ‘true’ claims. The payoff, of course, is that we cannot be 
charged either with saying things that are false.
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This kind of confessional view has much to recommend it. Here, choosing the 
Christian life is choosing to picture the world in a certain way; Wittgenstein (1966; 
1969) refers to this phenomenon as ‘seeing-as’. The believer sees the world as a 
certain  configuration; perhaps as a world of grace, guilt, and salvation. T he 
unbeliever sees the world as a different configuration; perhaps as a world of cause, 
effect, and fate. T he question of which view is ‘true’ does not arise for Wittgenstein 
because the believer and the unbeliever are simply ‘using different pictures’. 10
Frei’s narrativism is reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Any question about the ‘truth’ 
of biblical narrative is an unfortunate category mistake. Before getting embroiled in 
modern theories of truth, one ought to stop and realize that the terms have already 
been botched. The scriptural narratives are like a picture of the world, a way of 
‘seeing-as’. Thus, the Christian picture cannot be more ‘true’ than any another; such 
pictures do not compete. They just do different things, have different motivations, 
uses, and purposes. The one who sees the picture of the rabbit-duck ‘as’ a rabbit is 
not seeing anything more truly than the one who sees it ‘as’ a duck. The one who 
sees the world as graced is not seeing anything more truly than the one who sees it 
as chance. They are simply seeing different things and, considering what they are 
seeing, the language of truth does not apply.
Frei’s theoretical commitment to self-referentiality affords him a second out; he 
now can excuse himself from those arguments that try to compare the beliefs and 
practices of Christians and non-Christians. Since there can be no cognitive issue 
between these two groups, we need not attempt to match one up against the other. 
The respective ways of ‘seeing-as’ are incommensurable. Each is playing a different 
game. Basketball and golf are played by different rules. As a golfer’s score will 
mean nothing in the National Basketball Association, so the results of Christian 
theology cannot be translated into the arena of secular life. Thus, it is another 
mistake to try to show in the public realm that Christian views are true.
This theological position is also attractive. It reminds us, for example, that the 
meaning of the Scriptures is inseparable from the form of life of Christian piety. It 
allows us to move beyond the seemingly interminable discussions of ‘whether God 
exists’ to get on with systematic and dogmatic theology proper. And it reemphasizes 
that religions are not merely intellectual systems but are also concrete forms of 
human practice: Personal and institutional patterns of behavior. There is, however, 
an important reason for rejecting this perspectivism. It does not seem to do justice 
to the intentions of just those believers who tell and retell the scriptural stories as 
their own. (Nor, incidentally, does it appear accurately to reflect the testimony of 
the first tellers of tales about Jesus. But since I am not concerned here with 
authorial intention, I will not try to argue for this claim.)
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Consider a crucial episode in the gospel narrative, one which is rehearsed every 
Easter morning. At that time, many Christians appropriate the resurrection story 
for themselves and their community, affirming to one another, ‘He is risen’. If Frei’s 
Wittgensteinian view is correct, this utterance is guaranteed a meaning within the 
believing community while it is denied the possibility of being intelligible outside it. 
That is, if any unbelievers are standing nearby, they are not able to understand the 
claim, simply because they do not know the presence of Christ. (Remember: they 
do not know how to identify the subject of the proclamation.) If they do not know 
who ‘he’ is, then they cannot follow the claim. But if they cannot follow the claim, 
they surely cannot contest it. Unable to contest it, they cannot object to it. If the 
pure narrativists are right, it turns out that it is literally impossible for Christians and 
non-Christians to disagree about the resurrection.
I doubt that this is what most Christians understand themselves to mean when 
they confess the Easter faith. Many Christians - irrespective of whether they are 
naive and ‘precritical’ or liberal and ‘post-critical’ - perceive some tension (if not 
contradiction) between their beliefs and the results of modern science. Will not 
these Christians feel more affinity with the atheist who disputes their claim than 
with the W ittgensteinian theologian who tells them it is immune from criticism? 
Will not many who affirm Jesus’ resurrection say that it is the atheist, and not the 
theologian, who is really playing their game by their rules?
The idea that biblical narrative is self-referential offers the pure narrativist a 
reason for being excused from any ‘public conversation’ about the narrative’s truth. 
But I think it fails as an explanation of the self-understanding of just those believers 
who most sincerely understand the gospel as history-like narrative. And it seems 
dubious to me that the biblical writers themselves would have understood their 
stories in this way.
Like the principle of autonomy, self-referentiality will not do as a theoretical 
foundation for narrative theology. Neither will the associated theological positions 
of fideism or Christianity as an autonomous language game. As I have said, I do not 
want to give up Frei’s suggestions for reading the New Testament story. I want to 
find a more consistent set of hermeneutical principles for talking about that reading.
II
I am now in a position to state what 1 take to be the central aporia of pure 
narrativism. O n the one hand, pure narrativists believe that stories are foundational 
and primary in the order of human knowing and acting. On the other hand, they do
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not want others to treat this conviction as if it were just one more way of looking at 
things, ‘just another story’, as it were. Purists would like others to see the truth of 
the Jesus story. But in order for them to move toward this goal, at least one of the 
things they will have to begin to do is to reason with us. Inevitably, this means 
entering the game of rational argumentation: making a claim, explaining its grounds 
and warrants, and allowing it to be critically scrutinized. When it comes to this 
point, however, the purist holds that Christian identity is on the line; either one 
sticks to the ultimate authority of ‘the story itself and lets the chips fall where they 
may, or one abandons the story - and the narrativist position - altogether.
To my mind, this response begs the question of whether narrative theology 
really intends to say something about the world. 1 do not think that we can have it 
both ways; either we are making truth claims or we are not. If we are not, then we 
must be content to have others say about us: ‘Oh, the Jesus narrative again; that’s 
just their story about things’. If we are - if we think that in an important sense this 
story is a true story about things - then we must accept responsibility for showing not 
only how one ought to understand the claim, but why it should be affirmed.
Some recent articles by Paul Ricoeur suggest one way we might do this.
In the past, Ricoeur has emphasized the ‘semantic autonomy’ of the meaning of 
sentences. I will argue here that his recent turn to the ‘text’, however, has led him 
increasingly in the direction of an aesthetics of reception (cf Ricoeur’s 1980: 272 
appreciative remarks about Hans-Robert Jauss 1977). He now seems willing to 
commit himself theoretically both to the presence of readers in texts and to the 
presence of truth claims in stories. Ricoeur would certainly agree with Frei that 
such truth claims present special problems for analysis; God is not an object about 
whom verifiable of falsifiable propositions can be asserted. But for the philosopher, 
religious utterances do make publicly intelligible claims about what is the case, and 
they do refer in their own remarkable way. He goes to work on specifying the sense 
in which religious discourse may be said to be true.
In order to show how an impure narrativism can solve the purist’s theoretical 
difficulties, I begin with Ricoeur’s revisionary contributions to the modern philoso­
phical discussion of truth, moving on to consider his view of religious language. 
Only a t the end of this sequence of projects do I take up his position on the 
specifically biblical narratives of Jesus.11
In order to begin building a justification for the truth of biblical narrative, we 
must first try to answer this question: To what sort of truth do biblical narratives lay 
claim? Ricoeur understands these stories as a species of religious language. 
Religious language in turn is a form of poetic discourse. In it the human imagina­
tion is at work, creating new forms of response to G od’s actions upon us. On
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Ricoeur’s view, the truth claims of religious texts are more like those of the poet 
than of the historian or the scientist.
In the process of trying to explain how artistic and religious languages refer, 
Ricoeur finds it necessary to describe a level of discourse that has been ignored by 
modern philosophy and linguistics. This is the level of the text, and Ricoeur insists 
that we grant it a place alongside the more familiar units of word and sentence (or 
name and proposition).
Ricoeur’s theory of textual referentiality goes something like this. T he sense of 
a word is a concept; the reference of a word is an object in the world. The sense of 
a sentence is a proposition that predicates something of a linguistic object. The 
reference of a sentence is its truth value, whether the proposition accurately maps 
objects onto the extra-linguistic state of affairs (Ricoeur 1977a: 75, 218). These 
views are all generally consistent with work in the Fregean tradition. But, argues 
Ricoeur, they do not take us far enough. Analyses of names and propositions must 
be complemented by analyses of the texts in which these units are found.
The proposition has a different way of referring than does the word. The text 
has yet another way of referring than either of these units. Texts have a sense; the 
sense of a narrative text is its p lo t.12 But texts also have a reference; the reference 
of a narrative text is the possible world it creates (Ricoeur 1977: 218). Even in the 
case of the most self-referential of texts, we can conceptually distinguish meaning 
and reference. Ricoeur insists that we must not separate the two; the intelligibility 
of each term depends on the presence of its partner. But neither are they strictly 
identical.
The figure of the ellipse might serve as an appropriate analogy here; the 
linguistic genre we call realistic narrative can be construed as a geometrical figure 
whose shape is determined by two inseparable but distinct poles. On the one hand, 
neither pole (e g, meaning) will make sense without its partner (reference). If one 
pole is displaced or given greater weight, the figure will be distorted; we will end up 
with an ovoid rather than an elliptical shape. On the other hand, the two loci cannot 
be conflated. If the two poles are collapsed into one, the figure will shrink into a 
circle. In either case, we have something other than realistic narrative. As Ricoeur 
has said of another matter, this dialectical relationship is ‘a polarity or tension which 
must not disappear into a simple identity, nor harden into a sterile antinomy, or still 
less an unmediated dichotomy’ (Ricoeur 1978: 13-14). Pure narrativists seem to 
succumb to the first temptation, allowing narrative reference to disappear into a 
simple identity with narrative meaning.
Making use of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic theory, we can now substitute a principle 
of dialectical m eaning for F re i’s autonomy principle. This will allow us to
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distinguish conceptually between ‘what the story says’ and ‘what it is about’ while 
still being able to insist that each is unintelligible without the other. In order to see 
what this view entails, we must consider more carefully Ricoeur’s conception of 
narrative reference.
The philosopher would agree with Frei that the meaning of a history-like story 
is its plot, the ongoing interaction of character and circumstance directed toward an 
end. But, for Ricoeur, this plot is always interpreted by some historical audience; 
one should not think ‘plot’ without thinking ‘the plot according to whom?’ When we 
do think in this way, we see the plot opening on to an entire world, a ‘possible 
world’. And the specificity of that world will be determined not simply by textual 
ev idence, but by how that textual evidence is construed by a specific historical 
audience. For Ricoeur, like Frei, the plot (or ‘meaning’) is found ‘in’ the text’s 
rendering of agents and events. But Ricoeur adds that the world (‘referent’) of the 
text always arises in the fusion of horizons between text and reader; it is a world 
possible for someone. In the case of written texts like the Gospels, the someone is a 
reader. So we should not say that the referent of the story is confined to the text 
itself. O n R icoeur’s Gadam erian view, a text is a structured interpretation of 
something by someone for someone else: A specific configuration whose meaning 
constantly depends upon the enacting, co-productive activity of an interpreter.
Like Frei, Ricoeur denies that realistic narratives refer ostensively to real 
objects, agents, or events behind the text. Nor does he think that they refer to 
archetypes, ideas or forms ‘above’ it. These fictional (Frei: history-Zi^e) stories 
suspend the everyday ‘first-order’ referentiality of language. But in doing so, they 
create a new, ‘second-order’ mode of reference: a possible world. (Remember that 
this is not unprecedented in the linguistic scheme of things. Each new level of 
discourse adds a new order of reference to the previous level. A name can denomi­
nate, but it takes a sentence both to denominate and predicate. In the same way, it 
takes a text to denominate, predicate, and create a possible world.)
Ricoeur’s ground-breaking discovery of the linguistic ‘textual’ unit enables him 
to enter the philosophical discussion of truth with a bold message: The three levels 
of d iscourse are always intertwined. In one way this is obvious; sentences are always 
made up of words, and texts of sentences. But, says Ricoeur, it is also true that 
words always imply (hidden) sentences, and sentences always imply (hidden) texts. I 
cannot presume to try to prove this claim here, but I will try to illustrate what it 
might mean.
Consider the name Jesus. All by itself it has a wide variety - perhaps an infinite 
number - of potential meanings. So we cannot begin to talk about any one of them 
until we begin to pick out one or more of the propositions in which it is used. We
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begin, for example, by moving from the name Jesus to the sentence ‘The Jesus I am 
thinking of is a Latino who wears a black leather jacket’. But even this sentence has 
a vast plurality of possible references. In order to indicate which reference I intend, 
I must identify that story that gathers together the exact set of sentences I have in 
mind. When I do this, I move from the level of propositions to the level of texts: 
‘The Jesus I am thinking of is a Latino who wears a black leather jacket. This week 
he refused to cut a deal with Frankie on "Hill Street Blues". This caused Joyce to do 
x, and the mayor to doy, which led t o ... and then to ... until finally ....’ and so on.
We can concep tually  d istinguish  and individually investiga te nam es, 
propositions, and narrative texts. But on Ricoeur’s theory we can never rigidly 
separate these levels. They are mutually constitutive, imaginable perhaps as a 
rounded figure with, now, three essential foci. Each word, when used, implies a 
specific set of propositions. Each proposition, when used, implies a specific set of 
stories.
If Ricoeur is right, all those concerned with questions of truth and reference will 
have to expand their territory to cover the peculiar domain of textuality. The tools 
of semantics and symbolic logic will not suffice for work in this area. We must begin 
to take account of such things as plot and character, theme and suspense, mood and 
setting. 13 This may well be one of Ricoeur’s most important contributions to the 
contemporary philosophical conversation. What is important for our purposes, 
however, is that Ricoeur’s discovery of the level of the narrative text provides a way 
to locate our claims about the truth of biblical narrative. Religious narratives intend 
to uncover the largest ‘text’ of human temporality. They are offered as ultimate 
stories within which all of our speaking and doing is revealed in its final significance.
Ricoeur is not willing to say that the biblical narratives are true and then 
withdraw from the discussion. Nor does he adopt a strategy in which talk about 
religious truth would remain confined to the ‘theology’ corner of the academy. For 
Ricoeur, the truth of biblical narrative does not inhabit its own autonomous 
language game; these stories present publicly intelligible - if extremely complex and 
ambitious - claims about what is the case. 14 On my reading, Ricoeur is decidedly 
not a literary autonomist or theological fideist.
For an impure narrativist, religious stories can and do make truth claims. What 
are these claims about? They are about the nature - at once mundane and extra­
ordinary - of living in time. Narrative, in which plot plays such a crucial role, is 
primarily concerned with the temporal makeup of our world. The truth claims of 
the biblical stories are claims about the innovative capacities and persistent 
characteristics of our species. Those stories purport to tell us about the outer 
borders and central heartland - the u ltim ate limits and daily rhythms - of
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specifically human existence.
To Frei this may begin to sound like a sophisticated version of apologetics, a 
new ‘new hermeneutics’ in which the interpretation of the Bible ‘becomes practically 
equivalent to general philosophical inquiry; and the language-to-be-interpreted 
becomes shorthand for a whole philosophical or theological anthropology’ (Frei 
1975: xvi). Is impure narrativism just the most recent attempt to turn Christianity 
into a universalist religion of being or language or, now, biblical narrative? In order 
to answer this last question, we must remind ourselves of the trajectory I have 
followed in presenting Ricoeur’s position. I have introduced R icoeur’s attempt to 
reorient the contemporary discussion of truth toward the level of the text. And I 
have considered his general views about the truth of artistic and religious narrative. 
But I have not yet turned to his specific views about the biblical narratives of Jesus.
Since Ricoeur’s literary and philosophical principles (dialectical meaning and 
possible worlds reference) differ so markedly from Frei’s, we might expect him to 
read the Gospels d ifferently as well. Ricoeur’s interpretation is at once more 
universalistic and more pragmatic, concentrating on the kingdom of God where Frei 
concentrates on Jesus’ identity. If Frei understands the stories as passion narratives 
with long introductions, Ricoeur understands them as extended parables about the 
kingdom. For Ricoeur, the texts are the end result of a process in which the oral 
kerygma was transferred to written form. In them, he sees Jesus the teller of 
parables becoming Jesus the parable. He commends John Dominic Crossan’s way 
of putting this: ‘Jesus proclaimed God in parables, but the primitive church in the 
redaction of these stories proclaimed Jesus as the Parable of God’ (cf Ricoeur 1981: 
100).
For Ricoeur, the ‘proposition’ of the text is not so much ‘the textual Jesus is the 
risen Christ’ as it is ‘Jesus’ life reveals the mystery of the kingdom of God’. This 
mysterious kingdom is not an imaginary or neutral world; as it is interpreted by 
specific individuals and communities, it becomes truly a possible world. It bears 
down upon us, making its presence powerfully felt. We often encounter its 
disruptive power in innovative forms of language - poetic language, especially the 
parable form so favored by Jesus. Through learning to hear the truth claim of this 
odd linguistic form, we may at last learn part of its message; everything, finally, is 
not in our control. We are not the masters of the universe.
For Ricoeur, this mysterious power is potentially present wherever language is 
used creatively. It can irrupt in any culture’s linguistic tradition, Christian or not, for 
its reach is truly universal. It may be that the major difference between Frei and 
Ricoeur is seen here, in the ‘universal’ R icoeur finds uncovered in the New 
Testament. Ricoeur sometimes seems very close to the position of Northrop Frye,
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who holds that in the end we must see literature either as an ‘endless labyrinth’ or 
else as a ‘total form’. Like Frye, Ricoeur opts for the Hegelian total form rather 
than the D erridian endless labyrinth. As the New Testam ent Gospels are, in 
addition to everything else, great literature, we should not be surprised if Ricoeur 
finds this same form embodied here. The unique referent of the Gospel narratives 
is not wholly cut off from other literary works. We come to understand its singular 
story by being familiar with the repertory, the archetypes, the ‘order of paradigms’ 
(Ricoeur) used in secular literature.
Almost as if he were responding to Hans F re i’s affirm ation of the self- 
referentiality of biblical narrative, Ricoeur goes on to caution that we misunder­
stand the process of interpretation if we see it ‘as some kind of interest in mastery or 
domination, in the fashion of rational reconstruction of a phenomenon or process’ 
(see Ricoeur 1983: 10). He does not want us to think of the total form as a universal 
taxonomy of archetypes. His position is different from the classical structuralists on 
this point. And he carefully distinguishes his position from the more apologetic 
stances of Gaston Bachelard (who talks of universal ‘elements of nature’) and Mirce 
Eliade (who sometimes writes of ‘cosmic dimensions’, implying that all religious 
narratives refer to the same ‘sacred’). But how does Ricoeur’s view differ? The 
answer might be that, for Ricoeur, the secret order of the paradigms reaches its 
fullest expression in the Bible. To my knowledge, he has not explicitly said this in 
any of his published writings, but it seems to follow from his comments about Jesus, 
the ‘Parable of God’. Biblical imagery, he has written, ‘is dominated from above by 
apocalyptic imagery that, through forms difficult to number, turns on reconciliation 
in a unity (my emphasis) - the unity of a one yet triune God, the unity of humanity, 
the unity of the animal world in terms of the symbol of the lamb, of the vegetable 
world in terms of the symbol of the tree of life, and of the mineral world in terms of 
the heavenly city’ (Ricoeur 1983: 10). This is the sort of narrative truth to which 
well-crafted fictional texts refer. It is safe to assume that Ricoeur finds this 
reconciliation in a unity expressed in the temporal world of the New Testament as 
well. And it may be in part his biblical emphasis that distinguishes Ricoeur from 
structuralists and comparative religionists like Bachelard and Eliade. Nonetheless, 
there is no mistaking that, whereas Frei with Barth concentrates on the particularity 
of Jesus, Ricoeur with Hegel emphasizes the universality of his Father’s kingdom.
Here is a clear difference in the way pure and impure narrativists tend to read 
the synoptic stories. But we need not overemphasize it. It is true that for Ricoeur 
the secret order, the reconciliation in a unity, can be disclosed not just in the 
narratives of Jesus but in any culture’s creative discourse. But this is not to say that 
every artist or reader of poetry is, on Ricoeur’s view, some sort of anonymous
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Christian. It is one thing to express or encounter the mysterious power. It is 
another to come to affirm it. Trusting it as ultimately beneficent is something the 
Christian believer must choose to do. Making the biblical story one’s own is a 
specific act entailing specific commitments. This is because the story names a 
particular agent as the focus of the unified God-and-world. Christians are those 
who experience in Jesus Christ reconciliation with their Maker. Christians are those 
who believe certain things, live a certain kind of life, align themselves with a specific 
community. To do this is to take a risk. For the dialectical narrativist, the scriptural 
stories do not insure faith; they are too extreme, to transgressive. And yet they do 
compete with other views: ‘Religious language projects its radical vision of existence 
... in tension and conflict ... with all the traits that carry this experience toward a 
shadowy humanism, or even an aggressive atheism’ (Ricoeur 1975: 27-147 esp 128).
To my way of thinking, this is the way the ordinary Christian understands his 
story. In the crises of faith, we are carried toward a shadowy humanism and even 
atheism. But we know that it is silly to continue to use religious language if those 
interpretations are correct. The faith cannot ultimately be sustained if its critics are 
wholly right. So, while constantly learning from the humanist, Freudian, and 
M arxist reductions of C hristianity, we must in the end always resist those 
interpretations. On Ricoeur’s view, the atheist and the believer are in the same 
ballpark, playing the same game, speaking the same language. They genuinely 
disagree about something, and there is never any guarantee that, in the end, the 
atheist will be defeated. Nevertheless, the believer plays for this team against that 
one because he is totally committed to the One whose presence has been felt here.
Unlike Frei, Ricoeur allows both practically and theoretically that the New 
Testament’s possible world is publicly intelligible. A  correct grasp of it, however, 
will not come to the general public through reflection on a set of propositions. As 
Frei in his exegesis, so Ricoeur in his theory affirm s the text’s referen t as 
inseparable both from its plot and from its reader response. For Ricoeur, this 
response is a concrete, pragmatic one; it is marked by faithfulness to God and 
solidarity with the poor and dispossessed.15 It demands total commitment, for the 
biblical story overturns, dislocates, our anthropocentric ‘project of making a whole 
of our lives - a project which St Paul identifies with the act of self-glorification’ 
(Ricoeur 1975: 125). >6
Ricoeur’s work provides a hermeneutical theory appropriate to a narrative 
interpretation of Scripture’s realistic stories. His literary principle of narrative 
meaning construes texts and readers as co-constitutive. Texts have meaning only to 
the extent that they have readers for whom they are meaningful. Readers, in turn, 
come to understand themselves only to the extent that they take the detour through
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the cultural texts of which they are a part. His philosophical theory of textual truth 
and reference holds that these stories do not refer to themselves. T hey refer to a 
possible world opened up between the text and reader. This world is inseparable 
from the text’s depiction of agents and events; it arises only in the story’s rendering 
of character and action. But it is also always possible for someone; it is in part the 
result of a reader’s imaginative response.
When it comes to actual exegesis, the new theory does seem to encourage a 
slightly different way of reading the gospel. Ricoeur emphasizes the text’s testimony 
to the parabolic nature of the kingdom of God, Frei the text’s testimony to the 
parabolic nature of the kingdom of Jesus Christ. Of course, we have yet to hear 
what Ricoeur has to say about the cross, and we do not yet know what Frei might 
write about the kingdom. But the two would seem to agree that the referent of the 
text demands the reader’s wholehearted consent, loyalty, trust, and concrete ethical 
commitment. For Ricoeur, the text not only has a meaning generally available to 
all, it also makes an intelligible, debatable truth claim. This claim, in part, is that we 
are not autonomous beings; we are fundamentally dependent upon each other and 
ultimately upon God ‘the name of the unnameable’ (see endnote 11).
a a •
The respective narrative theologies of Hans Frei and Paul Ricoeur represent 
exciting new developments in Christian thought. While there are unmistakable 
similarities between their views, they remain firmly opposed on the issue I have 
identified in my title. Frei thinks that the biblical stories are true, but he cannot see 
any point in trying to argue this matter publicly. Thus, to put it oversimply, he insists 
on meaning while sacrificing truth. Ricoeur not only thinks that the stories make 
truth claims, but he believes that they challenge the way modern philosophers think 
and talk about truth. In being willing to say what he means by ‘true’ here, he lends 
credence to the idea that the biblical narratives make genuine, public, perhaps even 
revolutionary claims about what is the case.
I have tried to show that Ricoeur’s is the more appropriate hermeneutic theory 
for narrative theology. It identifies literary and philosophical principles that cohere 
with a narrative interpretation of the Gospels, and it understands religious stories in 
much the same way that many Christian speakers intend them. We should not 
forget that in an important way the work of the two men is complementary. Hans 
Frei shows us how to read the New Testament, Paul Ricoeur shows us how to talk 
about that activity. But their respective theological views - what I have called pure 
and impure narrativism - cannot so easily be harmonized.
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ENDNOTES
1 Neither Frei nor Ricoeur has published anything like a systematic ‘narrative 
theology’. In Frei’s case, we have a book (1975) that represents his actual 
interpretation of the New Testament story but only hints about his general 
interpretive principles. For these, see Frei 1974. In Ricoeur’s case, we have 
several statements of his general hermeneutic theory: e g, Ricoeur 1976; 1974; 
1977a. However, we have very little from him by the way of actual readings of 
biblical narratives. (Unfortunately he has not yet allowed his Sarum lectures to 
appear in print. ‘Time and narrative in the Bible: Toward a narrative 
theology’.) In both cases, then, part of my task here is to extrapolate from the 
published works, imaginatively supplying a fuller account of each w riter’s 
‘narrativist’ stance.
2 In order to avoid confusion, 1 must point out that Frei’s first published book is a 
sustained attack on biblical critics who detach questions about the meaning of 
the biblical narrative from questions about its truth. Frei believes that this is a 
grave error; one cannot and must not separate the ‘truth’ of the story from its 
meaning. For Frei, then, the biblical story is the true account of reality; all 
theology should proceed from this basis. Having said this, my claim that Frei is 
not interested in questions about the story’s truth will appear puzzling indeed. 
Have I completely misunderstood him? In think not. His is a radical and frank 
dismissal of all contemporary discussions of truth. Frei believes that the ‘true’ 
shape of reality is rendered in the cumulative biblical narrative, but he does not 
explain what he means by the word in quotes.
3 P ure n arra tiv is ts  g ran t rea lis tic  n arra tiv e  a priv ileged  position  over 
philosophical, social scientific, historical, and poetic discourse. Impurists give 
narrative its own independence but construe it as dialectically related to the 
others.
4 Such writers as William J Bausch (1984), Terrence W Tilley (1985), John S 
Dunne (1973) and Robert McAfee Brown (1980: 545-549) are pure narrativists. 
O ther theologians who seem to share many of the family resemblances are 
Stephen Crites, George Lindbeck, Sallie McFague, George Stroup, Stanley 
Hauerwas, Michael Goldberg and James McClendon.
5 Such otherwise diverse writers as H Richard Niebuhr, Julian Hartt, William 
Beardslee, Philip Rossi, Basil Mitchell, Brain Wicker, William Christian, John 
Hick, Brian Hebblethwaite, and David Tracy exhibit many of the traits of 
impure narrativism.
6 In part, this is probably because Frei thinks the claim, like the story, is quite
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intelligible in its own right. Compare his comments on the ‘pathos’ of the late 
twentieth-century revival of talk about ‘the historical Jesus’. That pathos lies ‘in 
the increasingly difficult and specialized conceptual apparatus that has to be 
invoked in this and cognate schemes in order to rescue the meaningfulness, the 
intelligibility of a supposedly universal claim ... said to be of utmost importance 
for all sorts and conditions of men’ (Frei 1974: 229).
7 Frei (1975: xvi n 1) wants us to understand hermeneutics in ‘the oldfashioned, 
ra th e r  narrow , and low-keyed m anner as the ru les and p rincip les for 
determining the sense of written texts’. U ntil a general hermeneutic theory 
appears that can trea t these large-scale issues without compromising the 
uniqueness of the gospels, we must remain content with ‘the more modest view 
of hermeneutics’ (Frei 1975: xvii). I want to argue that Ricoeur’s ‘high-powered’ 
hermeneutic is not only more fitting than Frei’s ‘modest’ one, but that it is also 
not ‘tyrannical’ in the way that the ‘new hermeneutics’ may have been.
8 Postm odern philosophy abounds with an tifoundationalists. I believe that 
‘postmodern’ theologians should think carefully before casting their lot here. 
Almost every view has some underlying principle or theory. And, no matter 
how we might try to ignore, underplay, tease, or deride it, it always seems to 
carry a weighty theological agenda. Frei (potentially an antifoundationalist 
himself) is a case in point. Is it not better that we recognize the foundations - 
and either affirm or change them - than pretend they are not there?
9 It is worth remarking that Frei (1975: xv, 104) seems to think of the gospel 
stories as having a singular, unified, and transparent meaning. They are not 
indeterminate, opaque, or multiple (as Frank Kermode (1979) has recently 
argued with regard to Mark). I do not mean to imply that Frei thinks the 
gospel’s meaning simple. His interpretation in Identity actually implies a very 
complex church dogmatics. However, the meaning of the gospel does have an 
undeniable quality of unicity for him; the meaning of the Jesus story is found in 
the identity description and contemporary presence of the singular man Jesus of 
Nazareth. It is not likely that Frei’s repeated uses of the definite article and the 
singular noun are unintentional.
10 The view is represented most clearly in theology by DZ Phillips (1965) and Paul 
Holmer (1975). These writers are surely purists when it comes to narrative. 
Holmer (1978: 69) says: ‘The logic of the discourse of science is not the same as 
the logic of religion .... Their kinds of explanation are in fact incommensurable 
... hence there is not logical incompatibility of a radical sort’.
11 Ricoeur (1977: 26) explains the relationship of these hermeneutic fields like 
this: ‘The biblical hermeneutic is in turn one regional hermeneutic within a
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general herm eneu tic  and a un ique herm eneu tic  th a t is jo ined  to  the 
philosophical hermeneutic as its organon. It is one particular case insofar as the 
Bible is one of the great poems of existence. It is a unique case because all its 
partial forms of discourse are referred to that Name which is the point of 
intersection and the vanishing point of all our discourse about God, the name of 
the unnameable’.
12 Ricoeur’s (1984) understanding of plot - or ‘emplotment’ - is roughly equivalent 
to Frei’s understanding of narrative ‘depiction’: the interaction of character and 
happening directed toward some telos. However, we should note that, unlike 
Frei, Ricoeur has on occasion affirmed the notion of a ‘deep structure’ of a text. 
In the light of Frei’s criticisms, this calls for a brief comment. Structuralists such 
as Propp, Lévi-Strauss, and Bremond understand narrative texts as temporal 
‘surface’ manifestations of a deeper ahistorical figure. For many of these 
thinkers, deep structure means a logical, atem poral matrix of operations, 
sometimes represented as a box of paired oppositions (e g, ‘raw versus cooked’, 
or ‘order versus chaos’). This is not R icoeur’s view: he refuses to think of 
narrative as a one-way street from the ‘real’ deep structure to the ‘apparent’ 
narrative surface. While he concedes that we can learn a great deal from 
struc tu ra lis t m ethods, he does not go along with s tructu ra lism ’s basic 
presupposition. Compare his criticism of Ivan Almeida’s belief that ‘every 
narrative maneuver can be represented on a semiotic square’. Ricoeur (1981b: 
72 n5) says that this method loses the essence of the narrative, what he calls its 
temporal advance, or its course.
13 Ricoeur, of course, has not been alone in arguing such a view. Kenneth Burke’s 
(1962: xvii) dramatistic notion of literature implies that all human expressions, 
from ‘systematically elaborated metaphysical structures’ to ‘legal judgments’, 
‘poetry and fiction’, and ‘political and scientific works’ can be understood either 
as dramatic stories themselves or as fragments of some larger story.
14 On Ricoeur’s (1977b:21) view, the claims of artistic and religious discourse 
challenge the presuppositions of ordinary discourse. Truth claims of ordinary 
discourse are based on two assumptions: that truth is objective and can be 
measured by the criterion of empirical falsification, and that truth appears to an 
autonomous thinking subject, a consciousness completely in control of itself. 
Ricoeur says that religious truth (‘revelation’) ‘violates’ these two assumptions. 
Truth, according to religious texts, is not transparent (it cannot be assessed 
simply by using the methods of adequation or falsification). Nor, according to 
the biblical stories, are human beings sovereign, selfpossessed individuals who 
can objectively survey such claims. Thus, Ricoeur’s theory of truth competes
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with the major alternatives of analytic philosophy.
15 Ricoeur’s narrativism has great affinity for the themes of liberation theology as 
sounded, e g in Metz (1980). Compare Frei’s (1975: 156-157) cautions about 
reducing religious faith to political commitment.
16 R ico eu r’s eth ics is not, however, an eth ics of un lim ited  d efe rra l and 
displacement. For such a deconstructive view, see Crossan (1980). For his part, 
Ricoeur (1975: 126) says that he does not want to be accused of ‘reducing the 
Christian reading of existence to a single aspect, that which Kierkegaard 
brought to its highest point of virulence, namely, paradox, and thus of neglecting 
its other aspects’.
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